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The recent literature on local schooling externalities in the U.S. is rather mixed: positive external effects
of average education levels are hardly to be found but, in contrast, positive externalities from the share
of college graduates can often be identified. This paper proposes a simple model to reconcile this mixed
evidence. The key idea is that advanced technologies are complementary to highly educated workers,
as opposed to traditional technologies which are complementary to less educated workers. Our calibrated
model predicts that workers with high school education or less are employed in the traditional sector,
while more educated workers are employed in the advanced sector. As the advanced sector is associated
with the production of differentiated goods and services this generates a positive pecuniary externality
(positive TFP effect) of college educated workers. By contrast, as no externalities are associated with
the traditional technology, high school education only increases private returns. The model predictions
are tested using data on U.S. states. We use compulsory attendance and child labor laws, push-driven
immigration of highly educated workers and the location of Land Grant colleges as instruments for
schooling attainments of workers in different states. The empirical estimates confirm that an increase
in college education, but not an increase in high school education, had significant positive production
externalities in U.S. states during the period 1960-2000.
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Schooling is a valuable private investment as it increases the returns to hours worked of individuals. Moreover, as
highly educated workers promote the development and adoption of better technologies, schooling may have large
positive eﬀects (externalities) on the productivity of all factors (total factor productivity or TFP). The cross-
country empirical evidence based on development accounting methods (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999) identiﬁes very
signiﬁcant positive correlations between measures of average schooling and measures of TFP across countries.
Similarly, the growth literature has found positive eﬀects of higher average schooling on growth (Temple, 1999
and de la Fuente and Domenech, 2001, 2006). However, cross-country empirical analysis is unlikely to identify
what part of the correlation between human capital and TFP is the result of an externality and what part is
due to common determinants such as institutions and social infrastructures. This is mainly because it is very
hard to ﬁnd a genuinely exogenous shift of schooling levels across countries and to track its eﬀects on TFP
in a cross-country analysis. On the other hand, the empirical research based on state or city data within the
U.S. that uses credibly exogenous instruments for the variation of schooling (such as schooling laws, presence
of public colleges or demographic structure) shows mixed results on the external eﬀects of schooling. Moretti
(2004) ﬁnds large TFP eﬀects of an increase in the share of college-graduates in US cities, while Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant TFP eﬀect of increased average schooling
across U.S. cities and states.
Beginning with Rauch (1993), the framework traditionally adopted to analyze the external eﬀects of school-
ing on TFP considers average schooling as a suﬃcient statistic to evaluate human capital’s private and external
returns. This strategy, however, neglects two well-established facts highlighted in the literature on cross-country
income diﬀerences (Caselli and Coleman, 2006) and the literature on technological adoption and growth (Ace-
moglu 1998, 2002 and Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001). First, workers with diﬀerent educational levels are not
perfect substitutes in production and hence the relative wages of college and high school educated workers
are aﬀected by their relative supply (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992, Angrist, 1995 or Ciccone and Peri 2005).
As a consequence, it seems appropriate to model two factors of production, skilled and unskilled workers, as
imperfectly substitutable. Second, the presence of highly skilled workers seems to encourage the adoption of
skill-complementary (or skill-biased) technologies. The 1980’s and the 1990’s in the U.S. witnessed a substan-
tial increase in the college-high school wage premium as well as an increase in their relative supply (Katz and
Murphy, 1992, Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998, Autor, Katz and Kearny, 2007). Furthermore, the relative wages
of highly educated workers and their relative supply was much higher in rich (developed) countries in the year
2000 than in poor (developing) countries (Caselli and Coleman, 2002, 2006). These facts are consistent with
systematic skill-biased technological adoption in economies with higher shares of educated workers (Acemoglu
1998, 2002). As a consequence we allow diﬀerent technologies to have diﬀerent degrees of complementarities
2to skills so that less educated and highly educated workers adopt diﬀerent (speciﬁc) technologies to maximize
their productivity.
This paper revisits the issue of schooling externalitiest a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h et w oa b o v em e n t i o n e df a c t s .W e
estimate the external eﬀect of schooling using U.S. data explicitly accounting for imperfectly substitutable skill
groups and skill-speciﬁc technologies. The novel contributions of the paper are three-fold: First, we introduce a
model of (two) regional open economies representing U.S. states that diﬀer in their distribution of schooling but
share a common technological menu. We distinguish two types of technologies: one complementary to highly
educated workers and another complementary to less educated. A supply-driven increase in highly educated
workers in one state produces skill-biased technological adoption and positive external eﬀects on TFP in that
state. Second, using the model, we simulate the eﬀects of an increase in high school education vis-a-vis an
increase in college education. These two shifts have quantitatively very diﬀerent impacts on productivity, with
only college education having a sizeable external eﬀect. Third, we test the model on data for U.S. states for
the period 1960-2000 using the method developed in Ciccone and Peri (2006). An important feature of our
empirical approach is that we can construct exogenous shifters of the years of high school per worker and the
years of college education per worker that we use as instruments. On the one hand, compulsory schooling
laws, in place between 1920 and 1970 and introduced at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent states (see Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2001), provide an exogenous shifter of the years of high school per worker across states. On the other
hand, a measure based on the push-driven immigration of highly educated foreign-born to U.S. states and an
index of the proximity of a state’s population to land grant colleges provide reasonably good instruments for
the state-variation of years of college per worker. Reconciling previous evidence (Moretti 2004, Acemoglu and
Angrist, 2001 and Ciccone and Peri, 2006) and in accordance with the simulated predictions of the model, we
estimate that one extra year of college per worker increases the state’s TFP by a very signiﬁcant 6-9% while
one extra year of high school per worker increases the state’s TFP by an insigniﬁcant 0-1%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and analytically derives the
equilibrium conditions for the cases of non tradeable and tradeable goods among states. Section 3 uses the
calibrated model to simulate the external (TFP) eﬀects of an increase in schooling due to increased high school
education and an equivalent increase in schooling achieved via college education. Section 4 uses the constant
composition approach developed in Ciccone and Peri (2006) to empirically estimate the eﬀects of increased
schooling on U.S. state-level data for the period 1960-2000. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Skills and Technology Adoption
Our model combines certain elements of Yeaple (2005) in a framework similar to that developed in Acemoglu
(1998, 2002) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). We consider two open economies, representing U.S. states,
3that produce two goods. The states have access to the same technological menu and have identical tastes.
We only allow them to diﬀer in the distribution of the educational attainments of their workers, which can
change due to speciﬁc events, such as schooling laws and immigration, among others. Unlike Acemoglu (2002)
and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) who model directed technological change, we do not try to explain the
creation of new technologies but rather consider a ﬁxed, exogenous and common array of technologies. Yet, the
diﬀerences in the schooling distribution across states will aﬀect the combination of these technologies and thus
the states’ sectorial composition. Our purpose is to analyze the external eﬀects of an increase in the educational
attainments in a state on its TFP. In order to develop an intuition for the sources of the externalities we present
ﬁrst a benchmark model with no externalities (Section 2.2) and then modify it with the introduction of a sector
that produces a diﬀerentiated good and generates pecuniary externalities. We consider the cases in which the
diﬀerentiated goods are non-tradeable local services (Section 2.3) and the case in which they are tradeable but
subject to trade or transport costs (Section 2.4). The main question we want to answer is what are the external
returns accruing to a state from an increase in the schooling level of its workers? In particular, are there external
returns from increasing its college education and/or from increasing its high school education?
2.1 Basic Framework
Consider the economy of a state that produces two diﬀerent and imperfectly substitutable goods: Y and X.
There is a mass of agents that for simplicity we standardize to one in each state. As a consumer, each agent











The parameter θ measures the elasticity of substitution between goods Y and X.T a k i n gg o o dY as the numeraire
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is the overall price index and E is total expenditure on both goods. The









X +( 1− β)θ (3)
As workers, the agents diﬀer in their skills which are measured by years of schooling.1 We index the education
1Hereafter, with a little abuse of terminology, we will use the terms skills, education and schooling interchangeably.
4of a worker with the continuous variable Z ∈ [0,1] and we standardize the highest level of education, a Ph.D.
degree, to 1. Hence, Z = 1 corresponds to 20 years of schooling, the normal time to achieve a Ph.D., while
high school graduation (achieved after 12 years in school) and college graduation (obtained after 16 years of
schooling) correspond to Z =0 .6a n dZ =0 .8, respectively. The distribution of workers’ education in the
state is described by the cumulative density function G(Z)a n dw ed e ﬁne W(Z) as the wage, in units of the
numeraire, paid to a worker with education Z.
Goods Y and X are produced using diﬀerent technologies and labor is the only factor of production. Workers
of any educational level can produce either of the two goods. We assume that the productivity of a worker
increases with her education in both sectors but it increases more rapidly in the production of good X.B e c a u s e
of the complementarity of its technology with highly educated workers we will refer to sector X as the advanced
or ”high-tech” sector, whereas Y is the ”traditional” sector. Consistent with these assumptions, productivity
as a function of schooling can be expressed by the following functions:
AX(Z)=e x p ( gXZ) AY (Z)=e x p ( gY Z)w i t h gX >g Y > 0 (4)
As mentioned above we are not interested in explaining technological creation here and thus the production
functions AY and AX (or, more speciﬁcally, the parameters gY and gX) are assumed to be exogenous and
common to both states. Finally, as labor is the only input, the aggregate income of workers expressed in units





2.2 Benchmark Model with No Externalities
We begin by analyzing the model when both X and Y are homogeneous goods produced by perfectly competitive
ﬁrms using diﬀerent technologies. For the moment, we will assume no trade between states and so we should
think of Y and X as locally consumed services. Since production and consumption of each good in a given state
coincide, their relative price is determined within the internal market. Perfect competition within each sector
ensures that prices are equal to unit costs. This implies:
1=PY = c WY = WY (Z)/exp(gY Z)
PX = c WX = WX(Z)/exp(gXZ)
(6)
c WY and c WX represent the wages per unit of eﬀective labor in each sector and recall that good Y is the numeraire.
In a perfectly competitive labor market, the wage schedule adjusts to equalize the unit cost of all ﬁrms using the
5same technology. Moreover, workers choose to work in the sector where they are paid the highest wage. Since
both goods must be produced in the state and highly educated workers have a comparative advantage to use the




such that workers with education Z<Z choose to work in sector Y while workers with Z>Z work in sector





exp(gY Z)i f 0≤ Z ≤ Z
c WX exp(gXZ)i fZ<Z≤ 1
(7)
The equilibrium allocation of workers and their wages is thus fully speciﬁed once we ﬁnd the threshold
value Z. Figure 1 plots the wage schedule, ln(Wage), against education Z. For educational levels lower than
Z, workers receive higher wages working in sector Y , while for Z>Z, workers receive higher wages in sector
X. The relevant (log) wage schedule is represented by the bold line whose gradient (corresponding to returns
to schooling) increases when moving from the low-tech to the high-tech sector. Notice that for each census
year between 1970 and 2000 the empirical log-wage schedule for US workers had exactly the shape presented
in Figure 1. The value of Z was in the vicinity of 12 years of schooling. This is shown in Panel 1 and will be
discussed in greater detail in section 3.1 and in Appendix 2 below.
The average wage in each state equals the per capita income and because of the standardization of the
employment mass to 1, it also equals the aggregate income:







All the endogenous variables of the model are a function of the cut-oﬀ level Z which, in turn, can be pinned
down using the market clearing conditions. In a closed economy market clearing implies that the demand for
each good in a given state equals its supply. As individuals spend a share s(PX) of their income, W, on good







Substituting (3), (8) and the fact that PX = c WX =e x p ( gY − gX)Z into (9) we obtain the following simple
2Walras’ law ensures equilibrium in the market for Y as well.

















⎠ = 0 (10)
This model can easily be compared with the standard two-skill model used in Acemoglu (2002) or Caselli and
Coleman (2006). Let us deﬁne L =
R Z
0 dG(Z) as the total employment of low educated workers (employed in sec-
tor Y )a n dH =1−L =
R 1
Z dG(Z) as the total employment of highly educated workers (employed in sector X).






















tively. Using this notation, condition (10) can be re-written as the familiar labor market equilibrium condition



















Equation (11), which also appears in Acemoglu (2002), shows that the average relative wage (i.e. the
average skill premium) depends on the relative supply of skills and their average relative productivity. The

















The distribution of workers between the groups of low and highly-educated (that is, below and above Z)a n d
within each group, together with the parameters gY and gX determine the average productivity of each group




L. Given the constant returns to scale assumption embedded in
(1) and the assumption that each worker is paid the value of her marginal product, an increase in schooling will
not generate any externalities. As the simulations in section 3.1 will show, any change in the skill distribution
G(Z) that increases the supply of eﬀective high skills, A
H
H, (such as an improvement in workers’ tertiary
school attainments) or the supply of eﬀective low skills, A
L
L, (such as an increase in workers’ secondary school
a t t a i n m e n t s )w o u l dr e s u l ti nat o t a le ﬀect on production equal to its private eﬀect. That is, the extra-output
produced is fully appropriated by the workers experiencing the increase in skills and there is no external eﬀect
o nt h er e s to ft h ee c o n o m y . 3 Finally, notice that for any given distribution of skills, an increase in gX relative
to gY represents what Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) call skill-biased technological change
3For example, the changes in wages induced by an increase in highly educated workers, namely the decrease in the wage of other
high-skill workers and the increase in the wage of low-skill workers, cancel out entirely due to the constant return to scale property
of the production function.




)4.F o r θ>1, such change will cause an increase in the skill
premium as well as an increase in the dispersion of wages within the group of highly educated workers.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition and Externalities
In order to obtain externalities from schooling we need to depart from the constant returns to scale and perfect
competition assumptions. An easy way to do this is to assume that the high tech sector produces a diﬀerentiated
good and operates in monopolistic competition.5 T h el o v eo fv a r i e t ye m b e d d e di nt h ec o n s u m e r ’ sp r e f e r e n c e s
produces an eﬀect from an increase in highly educated workers analogous to a positive TFP eﬀect.
Good Y is still a homogeneous good produced under constant returns to scale while good X is a diﬀerentiated














where v ∈ [0,N] is an index denoting the diﬀerent varieties and σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of X. We assume the varieties to be closer substitutes for each other than they are with the homogenous good






















Each individual variety of good X is produced using a common technology that requires a ﬁxed cost FX in
the form of output that cannot be sold. This can be considered a research/start-up cost to develop the variety
v. Each ﬁrm is the sole producer of a distinct variety and there is free entry in sector X. The productivity, in
units of output, of a worker with education Z is still given by AY (Z)=e x p ( gY Z)a n dAX(Z)=e x p ( gXZ),
with gX >g Y , and so the unit (labor) costs or ”eﬀective wages” are like those in (6). Similar to the previous
section, there is a threshold value Z = Z, satisfying c WX =e x p ( gY −gX)Z, such that workers with skills Z<Z
choose to work in sector Y ,a n dw o r k e r sw i t hZ>Z choose to work in sector X. Thus, the wage schedule and
4To be exact a change in gX changes also the equilibrium value of Z and hence indirectly the amount of eﬀective skills of each
group. In our simulations the eﬀects of changes in parameter values on Z are not very signiﬁcant.
5An alternative way to introduce externalities while maintaining perfect competition in both sectors is to interpret good C as a
ﬁnal good produced using the intermediates X and Y,and allow in the production function in (1) a TFP term depending on A
HH
. Such term would capture learning or matching externalities in the local economy.
8average wage are still given by (7) and (8), respectively.
Proﬁt-maximization and free entry in sector X imply mark-up pricing and a scale of production x(v)p r o -
portional to the ﬁxed cost:
p(v)= σ
σ−1c WX x(v)=( σ − 1)FX for v ∈ [0,N] (16)
At the symmetric equilibrium the price and the quantity produced by each ﬁrm are identical. Aggregating over




















= x(v)p(v) v ∈ [0,N] (19)
Substituting the equilibrium values of x(v),p (v), N and W and using the notation introduced above for




H, equation (19) can be rewritten as:
s(PX)A
L
L =[ 1− s(PX)]c WXA
H
H (20)
Moreover, using (3), (17) and (18) we can derive the relative eﬀective wage which now amounts to:
c WX
c WY

































θ(σ−1). N o wa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee ﬀective supply of highly educated workers, A
H
H, say due to an increase
in schooling attainments of workers above Z, not only has the (negative) neoclassical supply eﬀect on wages












































σ−1 . Compared to the case of perfect competition (see equation (12)), the elasticity
(in absolute values) of the price PX to an increase in the supply of highly educated, A
H
H, is now higher ( σ
θ(σ−1)
versus 1
θ). That is, the decrease in PX (and therefore in the overall price index) in response to an increase in
the supply of highly educated is larger now. Combining the eﬀect on wages and prices, we obtain that the real
wage of highly educated workers does not decrease in this case by as much as the neoclassical supply eﬀect
would predict and that the real wage of less educated workers increases by more than before. This implies that
the extra total real output (wages) generated by the increase in the supply of highly educated workers is higher
than that generated in the benchmark case. Hence, there must be some external eﬀect accruing to the workers.
Equations (21) and (22) also show that keeping the supply of highly educated, A
H
H, constant, a change in the
supply of less educated, A
L
L, only has the neoclassical (relative supply) eﬀects on c WX and PX.6 In short, the
model presented in this section generates positive externalities from increases in the education of highly skilled
(changes in the skill distribution above the threshold level Z)a n dn oe x t e r n a le ﬀects for improvements in the
education of low-skilled (changes in the distribution below Z).
2.4 Adding Trade to the Model
The most plausible, although analytically most intricate, case is one in which the two states are not only open
in their access to technology but can also trade with each other. As state economies produce a combination of
tradeable and non-tradeable goods and services we capture imperfect tradeability by introducing a trade cost.
For simplicity we assume iceberg trade costs of τ for the diﬀerentiated good X, 7 and no trade costs for the
homogenous good Y. Except for the addition of trade costs, the model with trade mimics that in the previous
section. Therefore we relegate the details to the Appendix and just present the equilibrium conditions with a
balanced trade account between states.
As each state produces a number of diﬀerent varieties of good X, the market clearing conditions for varieties
of good X produced in each state are given by
ϑ11s(PX1)A
L





















=( 1− ϑ22s(PX2)) c WX2A
H
2 H2
6To be precise, a change in the skill distribution, below and above Z, changes the equilibrium value of Z and hence indirectly
the amount of eﬀective skills of highly educated, A
HH. However, for the changes in A
LL we consider in section 3.1, the indirect
eﬀect on A
HH through Z is negligible.
7For one unit of any variety of good X to arrive τ>1 units must be shipped.
10where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the state, ϑii and ϑji are the shares of the expenditure on good X that
consumers in state i devote to local and imported varieties, respectively, and the other variables are deﬁned as
in the previous section. The similarity of (23) with the condition in (20) is apparent. The diﬀerence is that
now only a share ϑ11s(PX1) <s (PX1) of income of workers in state 1 is spent on varieties produced in that








represents the demand for varieties produced in state








operates symmetrically for state 2).
It is easy to show that for zero trade costs (τ = 1) the equations in (23) add up to an expression identical





1 L1 + A
L




1 H1 + A
H
2 H2. An increase in the
eﬀective supply of highly educated workers in state i, A
H
i Hi, w o u l dt h e nh a v eap o s i t i v ee x t e r n a le ﬀect on the
U.S. real income. That is, the external eﬀect would be perfectly diﬀused between the two states because free
trade allows them to equally beneﬁt from the increased variety of good X. However, as long as there are some
trade costs (τ>1), we have a ”home-bias” in the purchase of varieties of X so that ϑ21 <ϑ 11 (ϑ12 <ϑ 22)
and the external eﬀect is larger (localized) within the state experiencing the increase in the supply of skilled
workers.8 In the case of positive trade costs the complications in the algebra make it impossible to obtain clear-
cut expressions for c WXi and PXi as a function of the relative skill supplies. Hence we rely on the simulations
to obtain the relevant results. As we will show in section 3.1, the higher the trade costs, the more localized the
externalities will be.
3M e a s u r i n g t h e T F P E ﬀects of Increased Schooling
The source of schooling externalities in our model is clear. There are pecuniary externalities derived from the
increased variety of the diﬀerentiated good produced in the high-tech sector. More precisely, since the technology
of this sector is complementary to highly educated workers, a larger share of those workers (that is, an increase
in H in a given state) or higher average schooling of this group (an increase in A
H
) leads to an expansion of
the modern sector and to a positive TFP eﬀect. By contrast, an increase in the share (or schooling) of the less
educated workers has only an impact on the production of good Y with no TFP eﬀects. While the mechanism is
rather speciﬁc, the spirit of the model is very general. The existence of technologies that are highly productive
and complementary to high-skilled workers implies that when this group expands those technologies become
more prevalent and the sectors using them expand. If there are externalities (from increased varieties, learning
spillovers or other sources) associated with those technologies/sectors then there will be a positive TFP eﬀect.
Our purpose is to use the model to quantify the eﬀect on total factor productivity (TFP) of diﬀerent shifts
8Trade costs are key to identify the TFP eﬀects of schooling in the empirical analysis. If the externality of an increase in highly
skilled workers in a state was perfectly diﬀused between states we would not be able to empirically identify it using the cross-state
variation.
11in the educational distribution of workers. Since workers are the only factor of production in our model, and




w(Z)φ(Z)dZ where w(Z)=W(Z)/P is the real wage for workers of skill Z and φ(Z) is the density
distribution function of workers over skills (so that
z Z
0
φ(Z)dZ = G(z)). Our measure of total factor productivity
will be based on real wages. As is evident from equations (21) and (22), in the model with externalities an
increase in the supply of highly educated has the typical neoclassical (or relative supply) eﬀect on wages and








, but it also has an additional positive external eﬀect on relative wages








θ(σ−1), respectively. In order to disentangle one
eﬀect from the other we adopt the method developed by Ciccone and Peri (2006): the ”constant composition”
approach. Based on the ”dual approach” to growth accounting, the idea is to measure changes in (real) output
by measuring the changes in (real) factor prices (in this case wages, as labor is the only factor of production).
This method isolates the external or TFP eﬀect of schooling as follows. First, by ﬁxing the skill composition
at its initial level, changes in output per worker due to increased skills are eliminated; second, by weighting
wage changes by the initial skill composition the neoclassical (supply) eﬀects on wages due to complementarities
cancel out. The remaining changes in constant-composition wages are non-zero only in the presence of a change
in total factor productivity (the external eﬀect) 9. Ciccone and Peri (2006) show that the percentage change
in wages weighted by the initial factor shares in total income, or analogously, the percentage change in average
wages at constant composition of skills, isolates the external eﬀect of an aggregate schooling change. That is,
the TFP impact of a discrete change in the skill distribution from G0(Z)t oG1(Z) can be computed as follows
∆ln(TFP)=











where the subscript t0 refers to the initial values and the subscript t1 refers to the values after the change.
W(Z)/P are real wages and φ(Z) is the density distribution function of skills deﬁned above.
The formula is a ﬁrst order approximation (as it omits second order terms) and in expression (24) it is
written using the initial skill composition. If the second order terms are not too large the formula would also
hold (approximately) using the ﬁnal (φt1) distribution of skills. The next section simulates the model and
utilizes this method to calculate the eﬀects of changes in schooling on TFP.
9We refer the reader to Ciccone and Peri (2006) for details on this procedure.
123.1 Parametrization and Simulated Eﬀects on TFP
We calibrate the model to U.S. data and then simulate the eﬀects of changes in the educational distribution
that took place in the U.S. during the period 1960 to 2000 on TFP.10 We use a value of θ (the elasticity of
substitution between X and Y ) equal to 1.5, which is the consensus estimate for the elasticity of substitution
between more and less educated workers (Katz and Murphy, 1992, and Ciccone and Peri, 2005). The value
of σ is chosen to be equal to 2, consistent with the average estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
”diﬀerentiated tradable goods” (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Based on data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005), the parameter β is chosen to be 0.65 corresponding to the share
spent on advanced goods and services (including all consumption goods except for food, apparel and personal
services).11 Finally, the technological parameters gX and gY , w h i c he q u a lt h er e t u r n st oe d u c a t i o ni nt h et w o
sectors, and FX,t h eﬁxed set-up costs for the advanced technology, are calibrated to match the average wage
schedule for the U.S. over the period considered. As illustrated in Panel 1, the wage schedules for U.S. workers
exhibit a change in slope between 11 and 12 years of schooling (high school graduation) which became stronger
after 1970. Accordingly, we can calibrate gY and gX to match the slope of the wage schedule above and below
12 years of schooling. The slope below 12 years (gY ) has declined slightly over the decades and the average
slope above 12 years of schooling (gX) has increased. Their average values for the period 1960-2000 was roughly
equal to their value in 1980. Keeping in mind that one year of schooling corresponds to an increase in Z of 0.05,
the returns to years of schooling for 1980 correspond to gY =0 .4a n dgX =1 .6, respectively.
The schooling groups and the distribution of U.S. workers over these groups for the period 1960 to 2000 are
reported in Table 1. One can see that for the period considered the two groups of workers with less than 12
years of schooling shrunk signiﬁcantly while the percentage of college graduates in total employment more than
doubled. Using the overall U.S. schooling distribution of the labor force in 1980 as the starting point and the
parameters described above we conduct the following two experiments. First, we shift 6% of the labor force
from the lowest educational group (0 to 8 years of schooling) to the next group (8 to 11 years of schooling).
This shift matches the average reduction per decade in the lowest educational group (from 28% of the employed
in 1960 to 4% in 2000) and to a large extent mirrors the eﬀect of the compulsory schooling laws. This shift
implies an average increase of 0.36 years of schooling per worker. In the second experiment we consider an
equivalent increase in average schooling obtained instead by augmenting the education level in the upper part of
the schooling distribution. To that end we increase the share of college graduates by moving people out of the
college dropouts group. For this shift to increase average schooling by 0.36 years, the share of college graduates
in the overall workforce needs to be increased by 10 percentage points.
10The details of the model parametrization and calibration are given in Appendix 2.
11Sensitivity tests, not reported here due to space limitations, were performed for β in the interval 0.55 to 0.7. The relevant
estimates of the externalities are quite stable to changes in this parameter.
13Table 2 shows the simulated eﬀects on TFP (externalities) of these two shifts for the various versions of
the model presented above. The ﬁrst row reports the external eﬀect of an increase in average schooling due
to an increase in high school attendance (ﬁrst experiment) whereas the second row shows the external eﬀect
of increased college education (second experiment). The third row shows the ratio of the two eﬀects. The
eﬀects are standardized so that they can be read as the percentage TFP increase for an increase in one year of
schooling per worker achieved with either shift. Column 1 presents the results obtained using the model with
perfect competition presented in section 2.2. As explained above, an increase in the education of either group
has the standard neoclassical eﬀect on the eﬀective relative wages but no external eﬀect; in this scenario the
increased output produced by an increase in schooling of some individuals is all privately appropriated. By
contrast, using the model with monopolistic competition and product variety described in section 2.3 we ﬁnd
evidence of signiﬁcant localized TFP eﬀects, especially in the case of increased college education. In particular,
considering the case with no trade (column 2), a one-year increase in average high school attendance barely has
an eﬀect on the state’s TFP (1%) while a comparable increase in college education has an external eﬀect of
8.9%. This localized TFP eﬀect is reduced when X is considered tradeable across states as the external eﬀect
then spills over to other states. In the empirical cross-state analysis we are only able to identify the increases in
a state’s TFP above and beyond the average increases in the national TFP. Therefore in the simulations of the
model with trade (column 3 and beyond) we report the ”diﬀerential” impact on TFP: the diﬀerence is between
a state in which the supply of skills increases and the other state where the supply remains unchanged. We
consider a value of trade costs equal to 2 (column 4 and beyond) as most plausible. Although costs equal to
100% of the traded value (τ = 2) are high for traded goods, many of the advanced services included in X (e.g.
education, health care, real estate services) are non-tradeable and thus one can think of their trade costs as being
much higher than 100%. In order to approximate the combination of tradeable and non-tradeable diﬀerentiated
goods and services we choose a relatively large average for the trade cost τ.Under this assumption, the localized
externalities due to an increase in the share of college graduates (column 4) is more than 5% per one extra year
of schooling while the externalities due to high school education are only half of a percentage point. With trade
costs equal to 50% (column 3) we still obtain localized externalities of 3.25% for one extra year of college per
worker and only 0.27% from one extra year of high school per worker.
Column 5 shows the results from the same two experiments and the same model as in column 4, but using
values for the returns to skills in the modern sector that match the higher returns observed in the later decades,
1990 and 2000. In particular, we use a value of gX =2 .7 which implies returns to an extra year of schooling
in the high-tech sector of around 13.5-14% (versus the benchmark value of 8%). Accounting for higher returns
to skills for the highly educated is important because these returns might interact with and strengthen the
externality. Indeed, the productivity eﬀect of increasing high school attendance is now around 1% while the
14change in TFP when college graduation is increased increases to 7.9%. Finally, column 6 calculates the localized
externalities when the state experiencing the increase in schooling initially has a larger share of the high-tech
sector because of a more educated labor force (calibrated to be one standard deviation above the U.S. average
schooling in 1980). In particular we check whether an initial specialization in the high-tech sector, combined
with higher returns to high skills, aﬀect the size of the external TFP eﬀects. The eﬀects are, however, very
similar to those in column 5.
3.2 From the Model to the Data
Our model captures the inter-relations between education, technology and productivity. It shows that if the
technologies of diﬀerent sectors have diﬀerent degrees of complementarities with education, economies sharing
the same technological options and trading with each other, but with diﬀerent schooling distributions such as the
U.S. states, will have diﬀerent patterns of sectorial specialization. If there are positive external eﬀects associated
with the high-tech sector such as the production of diﬀerentiated varieties of goods or learning spillovers, as
well as imperfect tradeability of goods and services, then localized schooling externalities arise. Moreover,
as it is more educated workers (with more than 12 years of schooling) who adopt the skill-complementary
technology, only increases in college education generate the positive external eﬀect while increases in high
school attendance increase only the private returns to workers. Indeed, the simulations show that for plausible
elasticities of substitution between varieties of the diﬀerentiated good the externalities from college education
are much larger than those from high school. However, there are other potential factors that might aﬀect
total factor productivity and that need to be taken into account in the empirical estimation. One of them is
nation-wide exogenous skill-biased technological change. If all states had the same initial sectorial composition,
then skill-biased technological change would aﬀect TFP in all states in the same way. However, if the states
diﬀer in their initial sectorial composition skill biased technological progress, even if common to all states, will
have a diﬀerential impact on TFP across states. Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Suppose that
a state with larger initial shares of the high tech sector experiences an increase in its supply of high skills at
the same time as there is nation-wide exogenous skill-biased technological change. The eﬀect on TFP of skill-
biased technological change could be confounded with schooling externalities. Using the model we can easily
disentangle the two eﬀects,12 though this becomes more challenging in the empirical estimation. We try to
isolate the schooling externalities from other TFP eﬀects in two ways. First, we identify supply-driven shifts in
the educational attainments across states and use them as instruments for the changes in schooling. We build
12For instance, if we want to compute the eﬀect of common skill-biased technological change in isolation, we only need to increase
the value of the technological parameter gX relative to gY while keeping the schooling distributions across states unchanged. We
simulated such eﬀect by taking 2 states with diﬀerent schooling distribution as in column 6 on Table 2, and then considered an
increase in gX from 1.6 to 2.7 common to both states. The state with the higher share of highly educated experienced a diﬀerential
increase in TFP of 13% .
15and improve on previously used instruments, and we test their validity and robustness. Second, to further ensure
that the instruments isolate the supply-driven shocks (especially for the college attainment instruments) and
not persistent demand-driven (sector-composition) shocks, we include controls accounting for the initial sector
composition across states and the induced sector-speciﬁc productivity growth to absorb the demand-driven
eﬀect on TFP and on human capital changes.
4 Empirical Evidence from U.S. States, 1960-2000
4.1 Empirical Methodology and Data
The data used in the empirical analysis are mostly from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS
herein) of the US Censuses 1960-2000 collected, homogenized and made available by Ruggles et al. (2005). We
select only individuals between 16 and 65 years of age who worked at least one week in the previous year, earned
some wage income and did not live in group quarters. The construction of the TFP changes for each U.S. state
over the four decades 1960-2000 follows the procedure developed in Ciccone and Peri (2006), and is simply the
empirical counterpart to expression (24) of the model and simulations. We compute the constant composition
average wage in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we regress the logarithm of the real weekly wage13 for individual i
in state s and census year t,l nwist, on a set of individual characteristics, Xit, (including gender, race, US-born,
marital status) and a set of dummies, lnω(H,E)st, that saturate the schooling (H)b ye x p e r i e n c e( E)s p a c ei n
32 cells combining four schooling groups and eight experience groups.14 That is, we run the following regression:
lnwist =l nω(H,E)st + λtXit + εist (25)
The regression, ran separately for each census year t and state s, is estimated by weighted least squares using
the individual’s weights provided by the Census. The set of dummy variables Xit is chosen so that the ”cleaned”
estimated wage, ln b ω(H,E)st, for each education (H) - experience (E) group corresponds to white, US-born,
married male workers. In the second stage we use the cleaned wages by state and year obtained from (25) and
the employment distribution by schooling-experience in each state-year to construct the constant-composition
average wage for each state and decade. If we denote the employment shares of workers in each of the education-
experience groups in state s for census year t by φst(H,E),H∈ {H1,...H4}, E ∈ {E1,...E8}, the intercensus
13T h er e a lw a g ei sc a l c u l a t e db yd e ﬂating nominal wages by the CPI; it is expressed in 2000 US$. Yearly wages are divided by
the number of weeks worked in order to obtain weekly wages. As the variable ”weeks worked” is categorical in the IPUMS for years
1960 to 1980, we use the median point of the interval for those years. As an alternative we also use hourly wage.
14The educational groups are the four traditionally used in the labor literature: H1 =[ 0 ,12) for High School Dropouts, H2 =
[12,13) for High School Graduates, H3 =[ 1 3 ,16) for College Dropouts, and H4 ≥ 16 for College Graduates. The experience groups
are eight groups of 5-year intervals spanning between 0 and 40 years.















where the superscript cc denotes ”constant composition” and we have expressed the percentage changes as
logarithmic changes. Using this measure in the next section we will analyze the relation between the change in
TFP and the changes in schooling across U.S. states.
4.2 High School Education, College Education and TFP
We start by showing correlations between changes in schooling attainments and changes in TFP across US
states. As illustrated in equations (21) and (22), the relative wage of highly skilled and less skilled workers as



















measure the years of schooling of less educated relative to
total employment and the years of schooling of highly educated relative to total employment, respectively. We
construct an empirical counterpart to those measures a sf o l l o w s .W ec o m p u t et h ey e a r so fs c h o o l i n go fw o r k e r s
with at most a high school diploma and divide them by the total number of workers. We call this summary
measure ”years of high school per worker” and denote it with school
HS
. This is our proxy for Z
L
. Similarly, we
compute the ”years of college per worker” (denoted as school
COLL
)a st h ey e a r so fs c h o o l i n go fw o r k e r sw i t h
college education divided by the total number of workers. We use this variable as a proxy for the average skills
of more educated workers (Z
H




across states and census
years is that they are directly comparable because a one-year increase in either of them represents an increase
in overall average schooling of one year. Hence the estimated eﬀects of these variables on TFP are comparable
with each other, are comparable to the simulated eﬀects of Table 2 and can also be compared with the external
eﬀect of one extra year of schooling obtained in previous studies (e.g. Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, or Ciccone
and Peri, 2006).
Figure 2 reports the percentage change in TFP, measured as ∆lnwcc
st, against the change in years of high
school per worker, ∆school
HS
st , for 50 U.S. states plus D.C. over two decades (1980-90 and 1990-2000) pooled
15The terms ”years of high school per worker” and ”years of college per worker” may seem inaccurate. After all, the group
of workers with at most a high school degree also attended years of elementary school and the group with college education also
attended elementary and high school. However, as we identify the externalities on inter-census changes, the diﬀerences in the two
variables between censuses is indeed moslty due to years of high school attendance for the ﬁrst group and years of college attendance
for the second group.
17together. Figure 3 reports, for the same sample, the change in TFP against the change in years of college per
worker, ∆school
COLL
st . In both graphs the variables are in deviations from the decade-speciﬁc average. While
there is no correlation at all between TFP changes and increases in years of high school per worker across states,
we observe a strong and signiﬁcant correlation between TFP changes and changes in years of college per worker.
The estimated slope in Figure 3 implies a 15% increase in TFP for an increase of one year of college education
per worker. Although the scatter-plots do not establish any causal relationship and are only drawn from the
most recent decades, 1980-2000, they already convey the essence of our empirical ﬁndings: only increases in
college education are associated with sizeable and signiﬁcant external TFP eﬀects16.






st. The table shows that the basic correlations identiﬁed in Figures 2 and 3 are robust to
the simultaneous inclusion of both regressors and to several changes in the speciﬁcation. In particular, the basic
speciﬁcation (1) in Table 3 reports the estimates from the following regression:
∆lnwcc




st + εst (27)
where αt are census year ﬁxed eﬀects, each variable measures the change in the 50 U.S. states plus D.C. over
each decade of the 1960-2000 period and εst denotes uncorrelated zero mean errors. The method of estimation
used is least squares with each observation weighted by the employment in the cell and standard errors clustered
at the state level. The estimates reported in column 1 of Table 3 show that an increase in one year of college per
worker is associated with an almost 7% increase in the state TFP, while an increase of one year of high school
p e rw o r k e ri sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha ni n s i g n i ﬁcant 1.3% increase in TFP. Similar results (with a slightly larger college
externality) are obtained when we control for three regional dummies (speciﬁcation 2), whereas when we restrict
the sample to the most recent 3 or 2 decades the strength of the positive correlation between TFP changes and
college education increases (speciﬁcation 3 and 4). In particular, speciﬁcation 4 shows a 15% externality of one
extra year of college per worker for the 1980-2000 period, while the years of high school per worker still have
a statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.01. Finally, omitting California, the largest recipient of immigrants
(speciﬁcation 5) and restricting the wage calculations to white US-born males (speciﬁcation 6) barely changes
the estimates. These correlations are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the model presented and
s i m u l a t e da b o v e .A si nt h es i m u l a t i o n s ,t h ee x t e r n a le ﬀects of high school education are never above 1-2% of
TFP. With regard to college education, the estimated external eﬀects are between 7% and 10% for the whole
sample and even higher (up to 15%) for the recent decades, consistent with the simulations (with transport
16The qualitative features of Figures 2 and 3 do not depend on the choice of decades. For any decade (from 1960 to 1990)
considered one by one or in groups, the correlation between changes in TFP and ∆school
HS
st is never signiﬁcant and occasionally
negative (between -0.03 and 0.025), while the correlation between TFP and ∆school
COLL
st is always positive and signiﬁcant (between
0.08 and 0.16).
18costs between 2 and ∞) which showed localized externalities between 5% and 9%.
4.3 Instrumental Variables: Discussion and First Stage
The obvious drawbacks to the OLS estimates presented above are the endogeneity problem and omitted variable
bias. Rather than being the cause of higher TFP, highly educated workers might be attracted to states with
highly productive sectors. Alternatively, the selection of highly educated workers to a state may be due to other
(unobservable) characteristics of workers, resulting in a spurious correlation of TFP and schooling. In order to
address these issues we adopt an instrumental variable strategy that uses three sets of state-speciﬁc determinants
of schooling attainments produced by supply rather than demand factors. Two of these instruments, based on
compulsory schooling laws and the location of Land Grant colleges, have been previously used in the immigration
and externalities literature as shifters of the supply of workers across US locations. As the power of the Land
Grant colleges instrument across states is rather weak, we also introduce geographical preferences of highly
educated immigrants as an exogenous shifter of the supply of college educated. In particular we use the uneven
distribution in 1960 of immigrants of some nationalities and the high immigration rates of highly skilled from
those nations to construct a push-driven change in highly skilled immigrants across states. We discuss the
construction and characteristics of each instrument separately in the remainder of this section.
4.3.1 Mandatory Schooling Laws: Child Labor and Compulsory Attendance
Our ﬁrst set of instruments are the compulsory attendance (CA) and child labor (CL) laws ﬁrst collected and
used in Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and in several other papers thereafter (Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos,
2004, Moretti and Lochner, 2004, Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2006, Ciccone and Peri, 2005). These laws, in
place between 1920 and 1970, aﬀected the schooling level of several cohorts of Americans. They were introduced
at diﬀerent times across states and they also implied diﬀerent requirements in terms of the years of schooling
needed before one could access the labor market. Hence, using these data we can identify the minimum years of
schooling required by the state where an individual resided at age 14 and attach that minimum requirement to
each individual. As the CA laws required between 8 and 11 years of schooling in most cases, we calculate the
share of workers in each state for which the associated CA laws mandated less than 8 years (CA<8) and those
for which they mandated more than 11 years (CA>11). We expect the ﬁrst share to be associated with smaller
values of the variable ”years of high school per worker”, and the second with higher values of that variable.
We also use CL laws imposing between 6 and 9 years of schooling to construct the dummies CL<6a n dC L >9
and corresponding measures of the share of people in each state associated with the ﬁrst dummy (for which we
expect a negative impact on school
HS
st ) and the share of workers associated with the second dummy (for which
we expect a positive eﬀect on school
HS
st ). These four variables, presumably uncorrelated with productivity or
19the personal ability of workers across states, are indeed correlated with the schooling levels of individuals, as
those laws signiﬁcantly increased the rate of attendance for the 9th, 10th and 11th grades as well as high school
graduation rates of the states in which they were introduced (relative to those in which they were not). Table
4 shows the explanatory power of these four variables in predicting changes in years of high school per worker
(columns 1 and 2) as well as changes in the share of people without a high school degree (columns 3 and 4). The
estimates are based on decade diﬀerences in US states plus DC and include decade ﬁxed eﬀects. Two remarks are
in order. First, notice that each variable has the expected eﬀect on years of high school per worker (positive for
CA>11 and CL>9a n dn e g a t i v ef o rC A <8a n dC L <6) as well as on the share of high school dropouts (negative
for CA>11 and CL>9a n dp o s i t i v ef o rC A <8a n dC L <6) in all speciﬁcations 1 through 4. Second, most of the
coeﬃcients in speciﬁcations 1 through 4 are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The joint F-test of signiﬁcance for the
overall set of instruments always rejects the hypothesis that they are jointly insigniﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence
level. The F-statistic drops quite a bit when we add region-speciﬁce ﬀects (speciﬁcations 2 and 4), although
it is still higher than 5 and, as mentioned, still statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As a check we use the
same schooling law shares to predict the share of college graduates across states (columns 5 and 6). We obtain
no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Furthermore, in this case the F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of schooling and
labor laws is always lower than 3, and one can never reject the null hypothesis of zero signiﬁcance at the 1%
conﬁdence level. As shown by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), these schooling laws did not generically increase
average schooling; they did so by increasing high school attendance rates and high-school graduation rates. In
other words, they shifted the schooling distribution in its ”low” range, leaving the high-end range unchanged.
4.3.2 Land Grant Colleges
An instrument aﬀecting the margin of college attendance and graduation across states is the presence of a college
close to where a large share of the college-age population resides. Card (1993) found that the presence of a four-
year college in the same labor market positively aﬀected the probability that an individual attended college and
graduated from it. Currie and Moretti (2003) used the same idea of college proximity to instrument mothers’
education in analyzing the latter’s eﬀects on children’s health. Proximity to college reduces the (material and
psychological) costs of attending college inducing some individuals, who would not have otherwise continued
after high school, to get further education. Moretti (2004) uses the presence of a Land Grant college in a
metropolitan area as a predictor of its share of college educated. Land Grant colleges were established in the
late 1800’s as a result of a movement to provide accessible higher education to people in each U.S. state. As
a consequence their initial location is not correlated with returns to education in the late 1900’s. Moreover,
they are evenly distributed across the U.S., and they became well established, large institutions over time.
Individuals living close to them are likely to have lower costs and thus a higher probability to attend them than
20others living farther away. As we intend to use proximity to college as an instrument for the share of college
educated in the state, we need to look at the coincidence of Land Grant college location with the location of
the population of college age. For each state we calculate the population between the ages 14 and 21 living in
counties within 100 Kilometers (60 miles) from a Land Grant college in every census year (between 1970 and
1990) 17. These data were obtained from the County and City Data Book, U.S. Bureau of Census (2000)18.
We then use the student-age population in proximity of a land-grant college as a percentage of the working age
population in each state as a predictor of the change in the share of college educated in the following decade.
As the push towards increased college attendance was diﬀerent across decades we interacted those shares with
decade dummies. Table 5 shows the power of these instruments in predicting the increase in the share of college
educated workers during each of the three decades considered. There is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
between the instruments and the increase in the college share in each decade, and the correlation is stronger for
the nineties than for the eighties and seventies. For a 10% increase in the share of young residents living within
100 kilometers of a land grant college in the nineties, the share of college graduates in the state increased by
almost 3 percentage points (column 1). Similarly that state experienced 0.46 more years of college education
per worker (column 2). The joint F-test of the instruments is above 6 showing that overall there is a signiﬁcant
correlation although not too strong. The diﬀerence with Moretti (2004) who also uses Land Grant College as
an instrument is that we use this variable to predict college education at the state level, rather than at the city
level. At the state level the eﬀect of Land Grant colleges (one per state) is diluted and our IV is not a very
strong predictor of college education. We check whether the instrument shifts education also at the high school
level (column 3). Such eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant in the 1970’s and 1980’s but it is not signiﬁcant (and
negative) in the 1990’s. While the correlation with high school education could still be an eﬀect of the lower cost
of college education, pushing more people to complete high school, it may also signal some unobserved features
of states (e.g. labor demand, level of urbanization, sector composition) correlated with schooling improvements.
Because of the limited power of this instrument and its limited ability to isolate changes in college education at
the state level we develop and use an additional instrument.
4.3.3 Imputed College Educated Immigrants
Previous studies (Card, 2001, Lewis, 2004, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005 and Cortes 2006 among others) have
used the uneven location of less educated Mexican and Latino immigrants in the 1960’s, and the tendency
of new immigrants to locate in the same state as previous immigrants, to construct changes in the supply of
less educated workers. Distributing the total net inﬂow of less educated Mexicans in each decade to states in
relation to their initial distribution, the cited studies construct a supply-driven imputed change of less educated
17We also utilized the number of potential students within 200 and 300 km from a land grant college with similar results.
18We are grateful to Jordan Rappaport for sharing these data with us.
21immigrants. By construction those imputed ﬂows are only based on the initial distribution of foreign-born by
nationality across states and on their total inﬂow into the US by nationality. As long as the initial distribution
of immigrants across states is not correlated with the subsequent technological and productivity changes across
states the constructed instrument isolates supply shifts. We adopt a similar strategyt oc o n s t r u c ti m p u t e di n ﬂows
of highly educated immigrants by state. Immigrants from non-Hispanic countries (especially India, China and
Europe) are generally over-represented among college graduates while they are under-represented among high-
school graduates and college dropouts. Hence, we construct an ”imputed” inﬂow of college educated immigrants
as follows. Using 1960 as the reference year, we compute the number of foreign-born workers residing in each
U.S. state and born in each of 57 diﬀerent foreign countries. We attribute to each national group in each state in
1960 the skill-composition of that group nationwide. While the initial share of highly educated workers in a state
is likely to be correlated with its sector composition and therefore with its subsequent productivity changes, our
instrument is based only on the initial distribution of immigrants by nationality and not by education. This
way we take care of possible selection bias of certain educational groups to choose certain states. To the 1960
imputed number of college educated by country of origin and by state we apply the inter-decennial national
growth rates of the college graduate population from each of those 57 nationalities. Using these values, that
are by construction orthogonal to the state-speciﬁc productivity shocks, we then compute the imputed share
of foreign-born graduates in total employment for each census year. This methodology exploits the fact that
certain countries (such as India and China) sent many of their college graduates to the U.S. during the period
considered. Further, if there is a higher probability that the new immigrants landed and stayed where previous
immigrants from the same country (of any education levels) already were (for instance, due to networking, taste
or informational reasons), then the imputed inﬂows of college educated will be correlated to the actual inﬂow
of foreign-born college educated and, as a result, to the total supply of college educated workers in the state.
To emphasize the validity of our assumptions, notice that in the year 2000 in the U.S. as a whole foreign-
born represented 8% of the college dropout group but 12% of the college graduate group. In some states (such
as California) foreign-born constituted more than 25% of college educated employment. At the same time,
the group of college educated from countries such as India, China and the European Union grew much faster
than the group of U.S. born college graduates. During the period 1960-2000, the number of college educated
from India, China and the European Union increased by 200 fold, 50 fold and 8 fold, respectively, while the
number of college educated Americans rose by only 5 fold. These increases are a combination of the increased
share of college graduates among immigrants of those countries and the increase in overall immigration from
those countries (especially for China and India). In the year 2000, college educated from China, India and
the European Union accounted for 6% of all college graduates in the U.S., while in 1960 they accounted for
0%. Hence, if immigrants tend to locate where their co-nationals already live, states with large initial shares of
22immigrants from those nationalities would have experienced a large supply shock of college educated. Table 6
shows the predictive power of the constructed share of college educated immigrants on years of college per worker
(speciﬁcations 1 and 2), on the share of college educated (speciﬁcations 3 and 4) and on years of high school
p e rw o r k e r( s p e c i ﬁcations 5 and 6) pooling decades and controlling for decade ﬁxed eﬀects. The constructed
share has strong predictive power (very signiﬁcant t-statistics and F-test) for the years of college per worker
and for the share of college educated in the state, while it has no power at all for the years of high school per
worker. The constructed instrument only shifts the schooling distribution at the high end of the schooling range.
This implies that identiﬁcation across states does not come simply from diﬀerences between high immigration
and low immigration states but from speciﬁc nationalities that are associated with high levels of immigrant
education and have a speciﬁc geographic distribution across states.
The tendency of highly educated workers to co-locate with previous immigrants from the same country should
be smaller, however, than for less educated. Indeed, highly educated are more mobile than less educated workers
and often move to speciﬁc jobs rather than generically joining the community of previous immigrants. Hence,
we would expect such imputed share to have less power to explain the actual share of college graduates than
t h ei m p u t e ds h a r eo fl e s se d u c a t e d .W ep r e s e n ts o m ee v idence of this in Figures 4 and 5 and Table 7. Figures
4 and 5 show the correlation between the imputed and the actual shares of foreign-born high school dropouts
and college graduates, respectively, across states. Although signiﬁcant, the imputed shares of highly educated
foreign-born explain much less of the variation in the actual shares of highly educated foreign-born across states
(Figure 5) than the equivalent imputed measure for high school dropouts (Figure 4). The R-squared of the
regression in Figure 4 is 0.42, while the R-squared in Figure 5 is 0.26. In other words, factors other than the
location of previous immigrants (such as technological growth or sector composition) aﬀected the location of
highly educated by much more than the less educated. Conﬁr m i n gt h i sf u r t h e r ,T a b l e7s h o w sal o w e rc o r r e l a t i o n
between the imputed share of college educated immigrants and the total share of college educated than between
the imputed share of high school dropout immigrants and the total share of high school dropouts across states.
Yet, imputed college-educated immigrants still have signiﬁcant explanatory power and their variation across
states is quite large relative to the actual variation of c o l l e g es h a r e s( s e et h er a t i oo fs t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n si n
Table 7). Tastes, imperfect information and network eﬀects are factors that can potentially inﬂuence the location
of immigrants, and even if they are likely to be less relevant for highly educated than for less educated, they
still have enough predictive power to construct a workable instrument. Moreover, in our empirical analysis we
use the imputed college-educated immigrants jointly with the Land Grant instrument in order to increase the
power of the IV estimation and we assess their exogeneity using the test of overidentifying restrictions.
234.4 IV Estimates
Table 8 reports the 2SLS estimates of externalities from years of high school per worker (ﬁrst row) and years
of college per worker (second row). The basic speciﬁcation estimated is (27) using decade changes for the US
states and D.C. over the period 1970-200019 and the method of estimation is 2SLS using the CA-CL laws, the
Land Grant College proximity and the imputed college-educated immigrants as instruments. We include all
of them in order to increase the power of the instruments. We also test for their exogeneity using the test of
overidentifying restrictions as described in Woolridge (2002). The test statistic, reported in the third row of
Table 8, is distributed as a Chi-squared with 6 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (that no instrument
enters the estimating equation directly).20 The ﬁrst column of Table 8 reports the 2SLS estimates of the basic
regression (the counterpart to the OLS estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 3). The TFP eﬀects from one extra
year of high school per worker is negative 1%, though insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, while the TFP eﬀects of
one extra year of college per worker is 6%, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Relative to the OLS estimates, the
IV estimates are smaller by 1-2 percentage points. This supports the notion that demand-driven TFP growth
might have biased the OLS estimates upwards. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are even closer than the OLS
to the simulated eﬀects from the model with costly trade (column 4 in Table 2). The test of overidentifying
restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments at a signiﬁcant conﬁdence level. Column
2 reports the estimated externalities when the percentage TFP increase, ∆lnwcc
st, is measured as described
in expression (26) but ﬁxing the skill composition in each state equal to its value at the end (rather than at
the beginning) of the decade. The estimates and the test statistics are almost unchanged. Speciﬁcation 3
shows the estimated eﬀects when the dependent and explanatory variables are constructed including only male
workers, while speciﬁcation 4 omits California, a potential outlier in terms of the presence of foreign-born. The
estimated high school externalities remain between plus and minus 1%, never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, while
the estimated college externalities are between 5 and 6%, always signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% signiﬁcance
level. Finally speciﬁcations 5 and 6 restrict the regression to the most recent decades 1970-1990 and 1980-2000.
Consistent with the OLS estimates and with the model simulations, the TFP impact of one extra year of college
is larger, although more imprecisely estimated, when we consider only the more recent decades. The TFP eﬀect
of college education in the 1980’s and 1990’s is estimated to be 12% while the eﬀect of high school education is
still insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Despite the large value, once we account for its standard deviation (4%),
the estimate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the simulated value of 8% from column 5 of Table 2. We should
also keep in mind that restricting the analysis to the last two decades signiﬁcantly reduces the power of the
instruments and hence increases the standard error and the potential weak-instrument bias.
19We omit in the 2SLS estimation the 1960’s as data on college age population by county in 1960 (used to construct the Land
Grant instrment) is not available from the City and County Databook.
20The degrees of freedom are determined by the number of the instruments, eight in this case (4 CA-CL shares, 3 Land-Grand
College variables and one imputed immigrants’ college-share) minus the number of the endogenous variables (2).
24Previous literature has not simultaneously estimated the external eﬀects of years of high school and years
of college. However, the available IV estimates of average schooling externalities (from Acemoglu and Angrist,
2001, and Ciccone and Peri, 2006) using CA-CL as exogenous shifters of schooling are mostly within the range
obtained in Table 8 for high school externalities (-1 to +1%) and statistically insigniﬁcant. On the other hand,
the existing estimates of externalities from college-educated (Moretti, 2004) are around 1% for each 1% increase
in the share of college graduates. Assuming that the increase in college graduates corresponds to a decrease in
high school graduates of the same amount, Moretti’s estimates imply an external eﬀect of 25% for each extra
year of college per worker. His estimates are based on data from the eighties and nineties. Our estimates for
that period are around 12%, large and signiﬁcant, and about half of the eﬀect estimated by Moretti21. Finally let
us notice that none of the IV estimates of the externalities from schooling is negative and signiﬁcant. If the only
role of education were to signal unobservable productivity of workers, exogenous changes of education across
states, such as those driven by schooling laws or Land Grant Colleges, would produce negative externalities.
By reducing the cost of education they would induce lower quality workers to get higher education so that a
certain level of schooling per worker would be associated with lower productivity. We ﬁnd no evidence of such
negative externalities.
4.5 Sector-Driven College Education and Sector-Speciﬁc Productivity Growth
While the previous IV estimation produces sensible results, reduces the potential OLS bias in the right direction
and the instruments prove to be reasonably powerful and pass the exogeneity test, one can still worry about
demand shocks that are correlated with the initial distribution of high skills and that aﬀect TFP while attracting
college educated at the same time. In particular, the initial sector composition of a state, interacted with
sector-speciﬁc productivity growth and human capital intensity may be the underlying cause of the estimated
correlation between college education and TFP. In this section we address this problem explicitly by controlling
for the eﬀect of the initial sector-composition on the demand for highly educated workers and on the productivity
growth of the state. In the ﬁrst set of regressions, reported in Table 9, we construct an ”imputed” increase
in the share of college educated workers across states driven by their initial sector-composition. We take the
composition of employment in each state in 1960 over 41 diﬀerent sectors (the classiﬁcation is close to a 2-digit
classiﬁcation, based on the variable IND1950 in the census and follows the one used in Hanson and Slaughter,
2002). We then apply for each sector in each state the growth rate in college graduate employment experienced
by that sector nationwide in each decade between 1960 and 2000. Adding across industries for each state and
year and dividing by total workers yields a ”sector-driven” imputed share of college graduates in the labor
force. This measure proxies for the demand-driven increase in college-educated in each state and is included as
21Moretti (2004) is aware of the very large size of his estimated externalities (see his discussion on page 195). Diﬀerences with
our estimates may arise from his choice of cities, rather than states, and diﬀerences in the set of instruments used.
25a further control in the regressions in Table 9. This variable is signiﬁcantly correlated with the actual change
in years of college per worker (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.73) indicating that demand factors are important
determinants of changes in college educated workers. It is also mildly correlated (correlation coeﬃcient 0.33)
with the imputed immigrant share of college graduates used as IV. Consequently, including it as a control allows
us to be more conﬁdent that the OLS and the IV coeﬃcients on the variable ∆school
COLL
st isolate a supply-
driven externality rather than a demand (sector-)driven correlation. Table 9 reports the OLS estimates of the
externalities (columns 1 to 3) as well as the IV estimates (columns 4 to 6) including the sector-based imputed
share of college graduates as a control. Relative to the basic ones in Table 3, the OLS estimates show a smaller
TFP eﬀect of college education, closer to 6%, and no externality from high school years of schooling. The IV
estimates of college externalities are somewhat larger (between 9 and 11%) and less precise, still compatible
w i t ht h es i m u l a t e dv a l u e so fT a b l e2 . W es h o u l dk e e pi nm i n dt h a tb e c a u s eo ft h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt h e
control and the instruments collinearity reduces the precision of the IV estimates. In any case, though, the
inclusion of the control does not eliminate or reduce the size and signiﬁcance of the college externality and it
does not change the insigniﬁcance of the high school externality at all. Using the initial or ﬁnal distribution of
skills to calculate the constant composition of wages (speciﬁcations 2 and 5) or restricting the sample to male
only (speciﬁcations 3 and 6) do not produce signiﬁcant changes in the estimates.
In a second set of equations, reported in Table 10, we control for the impact of initial sector composition
on productivity growth by state. Using data on Gross State Product by sector 1963-1997 (from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis) and merging them with employment data from the Census 1960 to 2000, we calculate the
output per worker in 41 industries (identical to those used above based on Hanson and Slaughter 2002) in 1960,
1970, 1980, 1990 and 200022. Then we calculate the share of state gross product in 1960 accounted for by the
top 10% , 20% and 50% most productive sectors. We interact these shares with the productivity growth of those
industries over each of the following decades and include the resulting variables as controls in Table 10 (third
row). The presence of a large initial share of highly productive industries may induce high TFP growth in a
state, particularly in decades when productivity growth of those industries is large (hence the interaction). The
possibility that such demand-driven productivity growth attracts highly educated workers may induce omitted
variable bias in the regressions. Table 10 shows the OLS (columns 1-3) and IV estimates (columns 4-6) of the
externalities when we control for this demand-driven productivity growth. The correlation between this type
of growth and the increase in college education (and with the immigration-based IV) is small (never larger
than 0.2) and the OLS and IV estimates are not very diﬀerent. The IV estimates of the college externalities
are between 5 and 6% and the high school externalities are never higher than 0.5%. We also constructed the
demand-driven TFP growth using the sectors with the highest share of college graduates (rather than labor
22We use GSP in 1963 to proxy GSP in 1960 and that in 1997 to proxy 2000 GSP.
26productivity) in 1960. The regression including those controls (not reported here) gives estimates of college and
high school externalities virtually identical to those in Table 10.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the connection between years of high school per worker, years of college per worker and TFP
using a new model and a new empirical strategy. Assuming the existence of two types of technology (traditional
and modern) with more educated workers having a comparative advantage in the modern sector, we gain new
insights into the eﬀects of a shift in educational attainments on total factor productivity. The nature of the
technology is such that below a certain schooling level (estimated to be around 12 years of schooling) increases in
schooling have low private as well as social returns because the technology used has low returns to skills and does
not allow for the production of diﬀerentiated goods. Above that threshold, however, higher education has large
private and social returns as the modern technology results in the increased variety of goods produced and hence
overall TFP gains. Using parameters calibrated to the 1980 distribution of schooling attainments, a good proxy
for the 1960-2000 average, the model shows that the increase in secondary education had very small eﬀects on
TFP (less than 1% for an increase of one year in high school per worker) while the increase in college education
had external eﬀects between 5 and 9%. Using compulsory attendance and child labor laws as instruments for
years of high school per worker and proximity to Land Grant Colleges and nationality-based immigration of
college graduates as instruments for years of college per worker across U.S. states, we are able to empirically
estimate these eﬀects. The empirics conﬁrm the insigniﬁcant external eﬀect of increased high school education
and large positive eﬀects of increased college education on TFP. Let us emphasize that the empirical strategy
used allows us to identify externalities localized within states only, while nation-wide externalities of schooling
(operating through institutions or common technological adoption) cannot be captured in this framework. Both
the model and empirical results reinforce, complement and elaborate on previous ﬁndings on human capital
externalities such as Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Moretti (2004) and Ciccone and Peri (2006).
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306 Appendix 1: Details of the Model with Trade
C o n s u m e r si ne a c hs t a t ec a nd e m a n dv a r i e t i e so fX produced in their state or the other; xji denotes the demand
from state i of a variety produced in state j. Each state produces a continuum of varieties, between [0,N 1]f o r


















Ei i,j =1 ,2 i 6= j
where pi is the price of varieties produced and sold in state i, while the price paid for imported varieties equals
pj.τ. s(PXi) is the share of aggregate expenditure devoted to purchase good X in state i and is given by
an expression similar to (3). Ei is aggregate expenditure; its value is as (8) and can be pinned down by the





1−σ + Nj(pj.τ)1−σ¤ 1
1−σ ,i , j =1 ,2 i 6= j (29)
The wage schedule in each state has the qualitative features of (7) and the thresholds Z1 and Z2 diﬀer between
states whenever their skill distributions Gi(Z)a r ed i ﬀerent.
On the production side, proﬁt maximization and free entry in sector X yield prices for the varieties produced
in each state and for the size of ﬁrms in a manner similar to (16). The only diﬀerence is that now the quantity
of each variety produced in state i equals the sum of the local and foreign demands:
xi = xii + xij =( σ − 1)FX i,j =1 ,2 i 6= j (30)
In the symmetric equilibrium the number of ﬁrms (varieties) in each state is proportional to the size of its
highly skilled group as in (18).
As before, the thresholds Z1 and Z2 are pinned down from the market clearing conditions. There are now
three sets of market-clearing conditions: one for the homogeneous good Y , one for each variety of X produced



































= x2(η)p2(η) η ∈ [0,N 2]
23By Walras’ law and because of balanced trade one of them is redundant.
31Let’s deﬁne ϑii and ϑji as the shares of the expenditure on good X that consumers in state i devote to local













with i 6= j
Substituting for W1,W2,p 1,p 2, N1 and N2 and using the notation for the eﬀective supply of highly and low
educated workers, A
H
i Hi and A
L
i Li, we can re-write (31) as they appear in (23) in the main text.
7 Appendix 2: Empirical Wage Schedule and Schooling Distribution
The model described in section 2 has three important implications for the wage schedule. First, the returns
to schooling for low education levels (the slope of the wage schedule) should be lower than for high education
levels (see Figure 1). Second, rather than a general convexity of the wage schedule, our model predicts a well
localized kink in the (log) wage schedule (again, see Figure 1). Third, skill-biased technological change in this
model takes the form of an increase in the diﬀerence between gX and gY . Panel 1 shows the estimated wage
schedule, using U.S. census micro-data for the years 1960 to 2000 (IPUMS, Ruggles et al., 2005); speciﬁcally,
we use the 1% sample for 1960 and 1970 and the 5% sample for 1980, 1990 and 2000. We regress the log real
weekly wages (yearly wages divided by number of weeks worked during the last year) on the usual individual
controls (sex, race, place of birth and marital status dummies and a quartic polynomial in experience), and
on years of schooling dummies. The sample is made up of individuals between 16 and 65 years of age who
worked at least one week in the previous year, earned some wage income and did not live in group quarters.
The regression is estimated separately for each census year. For the 1960-80 period we can estimate a speciﬁc
return for each yearly attainment (as the schooling data report the highest grade attended) while for 1990 and
2000 we convert the categorical variables provided into years of schooling using the conversion table available
in Park (1994) and we estimate returns only for those attainments. Panel 1 reports the estimated value for the
schooling dummies on the vertical axis against years of schooling on the horizontal axis. What is apparent from
the reported wage schedules is that from 1970, and increasingly over time, the returns to schooling below 12
years (high school graduation) have been lower than the returns to schooling above 12 years. Interestingly, the
kink in the wage schedule (Z in our model) appears to be around 12 years of schooling (high school graduation)
in each census year, and the skill-biased technological change of the 1980s and 1990s has taken the form of a
higher gX. If we estimate linear returns to schooling allowing for a diﬀerent slope below and above 12 years we
obtain signiﬁcantly diﬀerent estimates for each census year (including 1960) and overwhelmingly so since 1970.
These features provide a direct conﬁrmation of the validity of our model and allow us to estimate gX and gY ,
and to calibrate FX in order to obtain a value of Z equivalent to 12 years. As gX and gY change across censuses
32we use their median values (equal to the value in 1980) which are gX =1 .6a n dgY =0 .4 corresponding to a
2% return to schooling below 12 years and 8% return above 12 years.
The distribution of workers’ skills, G(Z), is captured by a 5-cell histogram in which we discretize the
continuous variable Z ∈ [0,1] into years of schooling, re-scaling the maximum achievable years (20, assuming
that a Ph.D. degree requires, on average, 4 years) to equal 1. The point Z =0 .6 (i.e. 12/20) represents high
school graduation and the point Z =0 .8 (i.e. 16/20) represents college graduation. The other two boundaries
of the histogram are Z =0 .4 (primary school) and Z =0 .65, 13 years of schooling (college dropout). Our
simulations assume an initial distribution of schooling across groups that matches the 1980 census, and then
test the robustness of our results using 1960 as the initial distribution. The initial density function for Z (at
time t0 = 1980) is computed by converting Table 1 values for 1980 into densities. For instance, the proportion
of middle school dropouts with education level between 0 and 0.4 is 0.08, which implies a density of 0.2 (such
that (0.4-0) x 0.2 = 0.08), and so on. The schooling density function is thus given by:
φ(Z)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0.2f o r 0 ≤ Z<0.4
0.7f o r0 .4 ≤ Z<0.6
7.8f o r 0 .6 ≤ Z<0.65
1.33 for 0.65 ≤ Z<0.8
0.95 for 0.8 ≤ Z ≤ 1
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬




















































Ln( X W ˆ ) 
Z
gYZ 







Figure 2:  
TFP changes and changes in years of high school per worker 
  























































































































Figure 3:  
TFP changes and changes in years of college per worker 
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Standard error: 0.03  
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Figure 4:  
Predictive power of the imputed share of high school dropout immigrants in total employment 
on the actual share of high school dropout immigrants  


























































































































































































Figure 5  
Predictive power of the imputed share of college educated immigrants in total employment 
on the actual share of college educated immigrants 


































































































































































































Standard error: 0.07 
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Panel 1:  
Log wage schedules 1960-2000 






















































































Note: Each graph reports the logarithm of the real weekly wage against years of schooling. These 
returns to years of schooling are the estimated coefficients obtained by regressing for each Census 
year the log weekly wages on years of schooling dummies and an additional set of individual 
controls.  We included individuals between 16 and 65 years of age who worked at least one week in 

















Table 1:  
Shares of workers in each of the 5 schooling attainment groups and average schooling,  
Aggregate US, 1960-2000 
 
Group: 1960 1970 1980 1990  2000
Less than 8 years, Middle School Dropouts 0.28 0.16 0.08 0.04  0.04
Between 8 and 11 years, High School Dropouts  0.22 0.20 0.14 0.12  0.11
12 years, High School Graduates 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.31  0.28
Between 13 and 15 years, College Dropouts 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.30  0.32
More than 16, College Graduates  0.10 0.13 0.19 0.23  0.25
Average years of schooling 10.65 11.56 12.64 13.11  13.22
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IPUMS data. Workers are individuals between 16 and 65 
years of age who worked at least one week in the previous year, earned some wage income and 




Simulated effects of increased secondary attendance and increased college graduation on TFP  
   Model with 
perfect 
competition 
Model with monopolistic  
competition 
Model with monopolistic 
competition 
and higher returns to high skills 






   (1) (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
  %Change in TFP as a consequence of 
one extra year of schooling due to 




0% 1.05%  0.27% 0.53%  1.09%  0.95% 
  % Change in TFP as a consequence of 
one extra year of schooling due to an 




0% 8.90%  3.25% 5.34%  7.90%  7.45% 
  (Externality from 
College)/(Externality from High 
School)  
 
8.46 12.17  10.01  7.23  7.81 












 Trade  costs,  τ  τ =∞  τ =∞  τ =1.5  τ =2  τ =2  τ =2 
The values of the remaining parameters used in the simulations are: θ=1.5, σ=2, β=0.65, FX is calibrated as to produce the initial value of Z around 12 
years of schooling, and the initial distribution of schooling is as that in 1980. 
Column (1) reports the simulated TFP effects from increased schooling in a model with perfect competition in both sectors X and Y. Column (2) reports 
the TFP effects of increased schooling in a model with monopolistic competition in sector X and no trade between the two states.  Columns (3) and (4) 
report the localized TFP effects of increased schooling in a model with monopolistic competition in sector X and costly trade. These effects are 
constructed as the difference between the TFP effects in the state where schooling increased and the TFP effects in the other state (diffused externality). 
The iceberg transport costs are set equal to τ =1.5 and τ =2 respectively. The simulation in column (5) is similar to that in column (4) except for a value of 
gX=2.7. The simulation in Column (6) considers states with different initial distributions between more and less educated workers with the rest of the 
parameter values as in (5). In particular, the state experiencing the increase in schooling is assumed to have a distribution of schooling similar to the U.S. 
state whose average schooling in 1980 was one standard deviation above the national average (Montana) while the distribution of schooling for the other 






Correlations between TFP changes and changes in years of high school and years of college per worker:  


















































2  0.72 0.74  0.70  0.71  0.74  0.64 
Number of 
Observations 
204 204  153  102  200  204 
 
Dependent variable: The percentage TFP change by state and decade as measured by the change in the cleaned constant composition real average wage, 
Δlnω
cc
st , calculated as described in the main text. Method of estimation: least squares with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year. 
Columns (1), (2) and (6) report the results of regressions on a panel of 50 US states plus DC over 4 decades 1960-2000. Specifications (3), (4) and (5) use 
a subset-of years or omit states as described in the column header. Fixed census year effects are included in all regressions.  In specification (2) three 
regional dummies (East, South, Mid-west, omitting West) are included. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by state are reported in 
parentheses. 









First-stage regressions: Effect of child-labor (CL) and compulsory-attendance (CA) laws on years of high 




Dependent Variable:   Years of High School per 
worker 
Share of workers without 
high school degree 
Years of College per 
worker 

































































































2  0.89 0.91 0.89  0.91 0.51  0.60 
Observations  204 204 204  204 204  204 
 
All regressions are in differences and they include decade fixed effects. Each column is a separate regression. Units of observations are 50 
U.S. states plus D.C. over the period 1960-2000. Method of estimation: least squares with each observation weighted by the employment in 
the state-year. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses 
** indicate a coefficient that is significant at the 5% confidence level. 
a: Null hypothesis is that the explanatory variables have no power in predicting the dependent variable. The p-value is the confidence level 






First-stage regressions: Effect of the presence of Land Grant colleges on years of college per worker, share 
of college graduates and years of high school per worker 
 
 
Dependent Variable  (1) 
Change in the share of 
college graduates in 
employment 
(2) 
Change in years of 
college per worker 
(3) 
Change in years of high 
school per worker 
People living within 100 km of a  








People living within 100 km of a  








People living within 100 km of a  


















2  0.72 0.71  0.80 
Observations  153 153  153 
 
All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Each column is a separate regression. 50 U.S. states plus D.C. are included over three 
decades from 1970 to 2000. Method of estimation: least squares with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 
*, ** indicate  coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% confidence level. 
a: Null hypothesis is that the explanatory variables have no power in predicting the dependent variable. The p-value is the confidence level 










First-stage regressions:  
Impact of imputed college-educated immigrants on years of college per worker, share of college graduates 
and years of high school per worker 
 
Dependent Variable:   Years of College Per 
worker 
Share of college graduates in 
employment 
Years of high School per 
worker 












































No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R
2  0.57 0.63  0.57  0.63  0.87  0.90 
Observations  204 204  204  204  204  204 
 
All regressions in differences over decades and include decade fixed effects. Each column is a separate regression. 50 U.S. states plus D.C. 
included over the period 1960-2000. Method of estimation: least squares with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
** indicate a coefficient that is significant at the 5% confidence level. 
a: Null hypothesis is that the explanatory variables have no power in predicting the dependent variable. The p-value is the confidence level at 





Imputed instruments for college-educated immigrants and less educated immigrants:  





Note: The first column reports the OLS coefficient, F-test and R
2 of the regression of the decade-changes in the share of college educated across 
51 states over the period 1960-2000 on the imputed share of foreign-born college educated. The imputation is done based on the 1960 distribution 
of foreign-born by countries of birth across US states. We attribute to each nationality in each state its average composition across schooling 
groups in the US in 1960, then we augment the group of college-educated by nationality and state in each decade with the national growth rate of 
college educated from that country of origin.  The second column reports the OLS coefficient, F-test and R
2 of the same regression for high school 
dropouts. On the fifth row we report the ratio of the standard deviation of imputed and actual changes in the share of college educated and high 
school dropouts across states.  
** indicate a coefficient that is significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Dependent Variable:   Actual share of workers with  
college education 
(1)   
Actual share of workers with no high 
school diploma 
(2) 





Imputed share of  foreign-born 
















Ratio: (standard deviation actual 
share)/(standard deviation imputed 












2SLS estimates of the effects of years of high school and years of college on TFP  
















(6)   
1970-1990
HS

























Test of over-identifying 
restrictions 
(p-value of a Chi-square with 6 








































Observations  153 153  153  150  102  102 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage TFP change by state and decade as measured by the cleaned constant composition real wage change 
Δlnω
cc
st  calculated as described in the main text. Each column reports estimates from a separate regression. All regressions include decade 
dummies. The observations correspond to state-decade changes between 1970 and 2000. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by 
state are in parentheses. The method of estimation is 2SLS with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year. We use as 
instrumental variables the imputed share of college-educated immigrants, the population share near a Land-Grant college and CA-CL laws, as 
described in the main text. Specification (1) is the basic specification comparable to specification (1) of Table 3, Specification (2) calculates the 
cleaned constant composition real wage change Δlnω
cc
s for fixed composition at the end (rather than at the beginning) of the decade.   
Specification (3) includes only male workers in the construction of the constant composition wage, specification (4) omits the observations 
relative to California, Specification (5) includes only the decade-changes between 1980 and 2000, while (6) includes only the changes in the 
1970 and 1990 period. 











Controlling for changes in human capital driven by initial sector-composition  
 
 
Dependent Variable:  OLS  IV, with all Instruments 







































Change in the share of 





















Observations  204 204  204  153 153  153 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage TFP change by state and decade as measured by the cleaned constant composition real wage 
change Δlnω
cc
st  calculated as described in the main text. All regressions include decade dummies. The observations correspond to state-
decade changes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The method of estimation for columns (1)-(3) is OLS 
including decade fixed effects, with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year and standard errors are clustered by 
state.  The period included is 1960-2000. Columns (4)-(6) are estimated using 2SLS estimation technique with each observation weighted by 
the employment in the state-year.  As instrumental variables we include the imputed share of college-educated immigrants, the population 
share near a Land-Grant college and CA-CL laws, as described in the main text. The period included is 1970-2000. 














OLS  IV, with all Instruments 
Specification:  (1) 
Control based 









Control based on 









Control based on 
top 20% most 
productive sectors 
(6) 
Control based on  
top 50% most 
productive sectors  
HS

























(Share of gross 
state product in 





























Observations  204 204  204  153  153  153 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage TFP change by state and decade as measured by the cleaned constant composition real wage 
change Δlnω
cc
st  calculated as described in the main text. The observations correspond to state-decade changes and are weighted by the state 
employment. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The method of estimation for columns (1)-(3) is OLS including 
decade fixed effects, with each observation weighted by the employment in the state-year and standard errors are clustered by state. The 
period included is 1960-2000. Columns (4)-(6) are estimated using 2SLS estimation technique with each observation weighted by the 
employment in the state-year.  We include as instrumental variables the imputed share of college-educated immigrants, the population share 
near Land-Grant colleges  and CA-CL laws, as described in the main text. The period included is 1970-2000. 
** indicate a coefficient that is significant at the 5% confidence level.  
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